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Abstract 22 
 23 
The outbreak of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has raised major health policy 24 
questions and dilemmas. Whilst respiratory droplets are believed to be the dominant 25 
transmission mechanisms, indirect transmission may also occur through shared contact of 26 
contaminated common objects that is not directly curtailed by a lockdown. The 27 
conditions under which contaminated common objects may lead to significant spread of 28 
COVID-19 during lockdown and its easing is examined using the SEIR model with a 29 
fomite term added. Modelling the weekly death rate in the UK, a maximum likelihood 30 
analysis finds a statistically significant fomite contribution, with 0.009 ± 0.001 (95% CI) 31 
infection-inducing fomites introduced into the environment per day per infectious person. 32 
Post-lockdown, comparison with the prediction of a corresponding counterfactual model 33 
with no fomite transmission suggests fomites, through enhancing the overall transmission 34 
rate, may have contributed to as much as 25 percent of the deaths following lockdown. It 35 
is suggested adding a fomite term to more complex simulations may assist in the 36 
understanding of the spread of the illness and in making policy decisions to control it. 37 
 38 
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 45 
1. Introduction 46 
 47 
On 23 March 2020, the UK government introduced a partial lockdown in an attempt to 48 
curtail the spread of COVID-19 through the transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. 49 
Leaving home was allowed only for essential reasons: food, health and work. Just over 50 
three weeks after the partial lockdown, the weekly death rate of registered COVID-19 51 
deaths peaked at 9495 [1], but had fallen to 6680 two weeks later, and continued to 52 
decline through July. Allowing for the time from exposure to death, the decline is 53 
evidence that non-pharmaceutical intervention successfully suppressed the spread of the 54 
epidemic [2, 3]. 55 
 56 
The main transmission mechanisms of COVID-19 are believed to be through viral-loaded 57 
respiratory droplets and close contact [4], although fomites [4, 5] and respiratory aerosols 58 
[4, 5, 6] are also suspected to be factors in the transmission. The restrictions on 59 
movement, whilst reducing person-to-person direct transmission, potentially continued to 60 
allow transmission through the indirect means of objects contaminated by an infectious 61 
person. Although viable amounts of the SARS-CoV-2 virus survive under laboratory 62 
conditions on contaminated surfaces [5] and articles in proximity to an infectious patient 63 
may show traces of the viral RNA [7], it has not been demonstrated that viable viruses 64 
survive in a natural environment in sufficient concentration to transmit the infection 65 
through this route. On the other hand, experiments suggest the lifetime of SARS-CoV-2 66 
on fomites is prolonged in a protein-rich environment like airway secretions [8]. 67 
 4 
 68 
The relative importance of indirect transmission compared with direct is unknown, even 69 
under lockdown conditions. WHO reports there is no conclusive evidence for fomite 70 
transmission, direct evidence for which is complicated by the frequent presence of 71 
infectious individuals with the fomites, making it difficult to establish which is the 72 
causative agent [4]. The report none the less cautions that the consistent presence of 73 
fomites in the environment of infected cases suggests fomite transmission is an active 74 
means of transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, as it is for other coronaviruses.  75 
 76 
Epidemic stochastic models and simulations (eg [3], [9], [10], [11]), generally do not 77 
include transmission by fomites, as the effective reproduction number may be adjusted 78 
for their effects to account for gross population statistics such as infection and death rates. 79 
As discussed below, direct estimates of the rate of fomite transmission are made difficult 80 
by the rarity of fomites in the general population. Yet the policy implications for 81 
transmission through direct and indirect transmissions may differ. Given that a 82 
moderately high proportion of the infectious population is suspected to be asymptomatic 83 
[4], there is a potential for infectious individuals working in essential services and who 84 
have not yet had reason to self-isolate, to unwittingly contaminate material that reaches 85 
the public with respiratory droplets. Whilst a lockdown will curtail direct transmission, 86 
indirect communication of the virus through essential services such as post deliveries or 87 
food supplies may be relatively unaffected. Additional policies may be required to 88 
mitigate their effects. 89 
 90 
 5 
As an alternative to direct case studies for establishing the prevalence of fomite 91 
transmission of COVID-19, this note seeks to constrain the possible impact of indirect 92 
transmission through population modelling using the SEIR model with an added fomite 93 
term. As discussed in the next section, the constraint is nearly independent of the nature 94 
of the fomites, depending only weakly on the decay times of viruses on fomites. To focus 95 
the analysis, transmission within the UK is examined. An illustrative example is also 96 
presented of the possible implications for postal deliveries in the UK, although only 97 
upper limits may be determined for any particular source of fomite transmission since 98 
they all add together to the net fomite contribution inferred from a global population 99 
analysis. 100 
 101 
2. Methods 102 
 103 
2.1 Model equations 104 
 105 
The standard set of SEIR differential equations for a population follows the dynamics of 106 
four sub-populations: the fraction s of the population susceptible to infection, the fraction 107 
e exposed to infection, the fraction i of infectious individuals, and the fraction r of 108 
removed or recovered individuals. It is assumed no removed individual becomes 109 
susceptible again. Sub-populations s and i are coupled through a term Rtsi/Di where Rt, 110 
the (time-dependent) effective reproduction number, is the average number of people an 111 
infectious person infects. The exposed and infectious periods are assumed to be 112 
exponentially distributed in time, with mean durations De and Di, respectively. 113 
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 114 
A fomite term f is added to represent the number of contaminated objects per capita. If Cf 115 
is the average number of potentially contaminated objects a person comes into contact 116 
with per day, then Cfi is the per capita number of objects contaminated per day. (The 117 
infectious fraction among individuals able to contaminate the objects is assumed the same 118 
as in the general population.)  The possibility of inter-article contamination is not 119 
included. It is assumed a contaminated object transmits the infection to an average Tf 120 
members of the susceptible population. The coupling term between the susceptible 121 
population and fomites is then Tfs f/Df. This represents the transmission rate per capita to 122 
an average Tf members of the susceptible population per capita by a number f of 123 
contaminated objects per capita for a duration Df that viruses survive on a contaminated 124 
object.1 The form corresponds to an exponential decay in infectiousness of the fomites, 125 
where Df is the mean duration. The epidemic is initiated by the introduction of exposed 126 
and infectious carriers at the respective rates ce and ci per capita (of the initial 127 
population). 128 
 129 
The model equations are 130 
 131 
 
1 For simplicity, an article that comes into close proximity to an infectious carrier is 
considered contaminated, and the average effectiveness of the contaminated article to 
transmit the illness is quantified through Tf. 
 7 
         (1) 132 
 133 
The susceptible, exposed and infectious fractions depend only on the product Nf = CfTf, 134 
the number of infection-inducing fomites introduced into the population per day per 135 
infectious person. 2 Initially, Rt = R0, where R0 is the basic reproduction number when the 136 
epidemic starts.  137 
 138 
2.2 Input parameter values 139 
 140 
The parameter ranges considered are summarized in Table 1. Estimates for values of the 141 
SEIR parameter are taken from Davies et al. [9] and Flaxman et al. [3] for COVID-19 in 142 
the UK.  Estimates for the mean duration Df of SARS-CoV-2 on materials are 0.41 (0.34-143 
0.49 95% CI) day on plastic, 0.34 (0.28-0.41 95% CI) day on stainless steel, and 0.21 144 
 
2 This may be seen by introducing the variable f* defined by f = Cf f*. Then the first two 
equations in Eq.(1) become ds/dt = -(Rt i/Di + Nf f*/ Df)s and de/dt = (Rt i/Di + Nf f*/ 
Df)s-e/De + ce, the final equation becomes df*/dt = i – f*/Df, and the third equation 
remains unchanged. Thus any constraints from infections and their consequences are on 
Nf, and not the particular kind of fomite, except weakly through Df . Only actual fomite 
numbers depend on a particular choice for the value of Cf; the exposed and infectious 
populations and the consequent fatalities depend instead on Nf. 
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(0.14-0.30 95% CI) day on cardboard [5], although it is noted the measurements were 145 
under ideal laboratory conditions and may not be applicable in a real-world setting. 146 
 147 
The number of cases of COVID-19 introduced into the UK is unknown, but estimates 148 
suggest at least 1356 infected individuals entered the UK, and likely more, peaking in 149 
mid-March (day 77 in the year) at the rate of just under 70 per day with a full width at 150 
half maximum (FWHM) of about 8 days [12]. A normal distribution with this FWHM 151 
fails to capture the tails in the distribution. The source distribution is modelled instead as 152 
c(t) = c0/[1+4(t-tc0)2/ FWHM2], and apportioned to the exposed and infectious carrier 153 
sources in proportion to the duration of their respective periods: ce = De c/ (De+Di), ci = 154 
Di c/ (De + Di). Once normalized to the initial rise in death rates, the results after 155 
lockdown are found insensitive to these choices. 156 
 157 
Although Rt will not have changed to a new fixed value instantaneously after lockdown, 158 
for simplicity lockdown conditions are modelled by taking Rt = R0 before the lockdown 159 
and Rld after. After lockdown easing, the reproduction number is taken to be Rlde. 160 
 161 
2.3 Means for estimating transmission rates 162 
 163 
The posterior parameter values and predicted death rates are based on a maximum 164 
likelihood analysis, where the likelihood of a given model is given by the product of the 165 
Poisson probabilities of the reported weekly deaths compared with the mean weekly 166 
death rates predicted by the model. The intervals for the modelled parameters listed in 167 
 9 
Table 1 are sampled uniformly. The derived confidence intervals for a given parameter 168 
are given by marginalizing the model likelihoods over the remaining parameters to obtain 169 
posterior distributions for each parameter. 170 
 171 
A mean infected fatality ratio 0.0050 is adopted. This is based on the age-stratified case 172 
fatality ratio, adjusted for underestimates from limited case reporting [9], the projected 173 
age distribution in the UK for 2020 from the Office for National Statistics [13], and 174 
allowing for a factor two smaller infected fatality ratio compared with case fatality ratio 175 
[14], as summarized in Table 2. The daily death rate per capita for all cases is estimated 176 
from 177 
 178 
            (2) 179 
 180 
where nd is the total number of deaths per capita, and allowing for a mean three-week 181 
delay from exposure to death [9]. The delay is slightly enlarged to four weeks during the 182 
initial rise to ensure the peak death rate is captured, necessary to provide representative 183 
infection rates leading into the post-lockdown period. All models assume the same value 184 
for R0 before lockdown to provide a fair comparison. 185 
 186 
By mid-July, it was becoming apparent that the decrease in the incidence rate of COVID-187 
19 in the general population in the UK had levelled off, but was on the rise again in 188 
August and September [2]. Rather than model the immediate impact of the initial 189 
lockdown and the rise in August and later, only data from weeks 18-34 (allowing for a 190 
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mean three-week delay from onset to death) are used to solve for Nf, , Rld  and Rlde. The 191 
data used are provided in Table 3. 192 
 193 
3. Results 194 
 195 
3.1 Fit parameters 196 
 197 
The rise in the number of weekly deaths before lockdown corresponds to R0  = 3.072± 198 
0.003 (95% CL) for the maximum likelihood model, allowing for uniform sampling over 199 
1.5 < R0 < 5.5. This is consistent with the range R0 = 2.68 ± 0.57 estimated by Davies et 200 
al. [9] from a meta-analysis of published studies.3  The results below for indirect 201 
transmission are based on the post-lockdown rates, with models assuming 0 £ Nf < 0.05, 202 
sampled uniformly over this interval. 203 
 204 
 
3 Using the determination of R0 from [9] as a prior makes little difference to the derived 
parameter values once R0  < 1.5 is excluded. 
 11 
 205 
  206 
                                                                     Figure 1 207 
 208 
The reproduction numbers and infection-inducing fomite rates found for fomite decay 209 
times of Df = 0.21, 0.34 and 0.41 day are summarized in Table 4. They vary little for 210 
different values of Df, as the decay times are very short compared with the evolutionary 211 
timescale of the epidemic. They all represent the data equally well. A weighted average 212 
of all three (allowing for small differences in variances and likelihoods) after lockdown 213 
gives Rld  = 0.79 ± 0.01 (95% CI) and Nf   = 0.009 ± 0.001 (95% CI). The post-lockdown 214 
value of Rt < 1 reflects the reduction in the infection rate following lockdown [2, 3].  215 
 216 
The UK began to ease the lockdown on 4 July 2020. The decline in the fraction of the 217 
population in England testing positive for COVID-19 levelled off over the following 218 
week [2]. The average reproduction number found from a maximum likelihood fit to the 219 
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numbers of registered weekly deaths after easing is Rlde  = 0.99 ± 0.03 (95% CI). 220 
Significantly, a value exceeding unity is included in this range, suggesting the epidemic 221 
may have already returned to a growing phase by August. 222 
 223 
Compared with a counterfactual model with the same values of Rld and Rlde as for the 224 
best-fitting model with fomites, the model including fomites suggests the presence of 225 
fomites contributed to an increase in the total number of deaths by about 25%, as shown 226 
in Fig.1 (dashed cyan line). These arise both through contamination by fomites and the 227 
subsequent direct transmission by the consequent infectious cases to the susceptible 228 
population. 229 
 230 
3.2 Illustrative case: postal deliveries in UK 231 
 232 
To give the constraint on Nf some context, potential indirect transmission by delivered 233 
post in the UK is considered. The Royal Mail adheres to public health guidelines for its 234 
employees, and it has placed several further protective measures in place in the delivery 235 
of post to customers [15]. Potential points of further accidental contamination not readily 236 
eliminated are the distribution of post to post carriers and during the sorting and final 237 
delivery to customers. 238 
 239 
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 240 
                                                                     Figure 2 241 
 242 
Approximately 14 billion letters and parcels are delivered per year by the Royal Mail 243 
[16]. The number of objects delivered per day per capita for a UK population of 67 244 
million is then C f  = 0.57 day-1 capita-1.4  The lifetime for SARS-CoV-2 on post is 245 
unknown. The value Df = 0.2 day for cardboard is adopted. The maximum likelihood 246 
model for Nf  ≥	0 gives Tf   = 0.015 ± 0.002 (95% CI). Thus only an average of three in 247 
200 contaminated articles transmits the illness. Since other fomites may be expected to be 248 
present, this should be regarded as an upper limit, Tf  < 0.017 (98% CI). The 249 
corresponding transmission rate is shown in Fig. 2. At its post-lockdown peak, the 250 
transmission rate by fomites is about 2x10-4 per day per susceptible person (Table 4). By 251 
 
4 The delivery rate is assumed to differ little from the mean for 2018-2019. Whilst the 
volume of letters delivered fell by 33% from April to May 2020, the volume of parcels 
increased by 37%. For the full year 2019-2020, there was little difference in the net 
volume of delivered letters and parcels from the previous year [17]. 
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the end of the lockdown period, it has declined to under 5x10-6. These are well below the 252 
direct transmission rates of about 4x10-3 per day per susceptible person at its post-253 
lockdown peak, and 10-4 at the end of lockdown. None the less, the slowing down by 254 
fomite transmission of the reduction in the total infection rate during the lockdown may 255 
have been sufficient to increase the death rate by as much as 25% (Fig.1). 256 
 257 
4. Discussion 258 
 259 
4.1 Effect of fomites on epidemic evolution 260 
 261 
Because of the practical difficulties involved in making direct measurements of the 262 
transmission rate of COVID-19 through fomites, a global population approach is adopted. 263 
It is found that adding a fomite term to the standard SEIR equations greatly improves the 264 
agreement of the model with the weekly death rate from COVID-19 reported in the UK.  265 
Compared with a best-fitting model with no fomites (Nf  =0), shown in Fig.1, with post-266 
lockdown reproduction number Rld = 0.84 (Table 4), a somewhat smaller reproduction 267 
number value (Rld = 0.79) is required to match the data when fomites are allowed for. The 268 
lower reproduction number is compensated for by the additional contributions from 269 
fomite transmission. 270 
 271 
A less intuitive consequence of fomite transmission is the larger reproduction number 272 
after lockdown is eased when allowing for fomites, Rlde  = 0.99, compared with the fit 273 
with no fomites, Rlde  = 0.92, a value the fit including fomites excludes with over 99.9% 274 
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confidence. The value for the fit without fomites is smaller because the infection rate was 275 
declining less slowly in the model before lockdown was eased compared with the model 276 
including fomites, as shown in Fig.1. To match the relatively small death rates after the 277 
lockdown was eased requires a smaller reproduction number than the model allowing for 278 
fomites. This shows that not allowing for fomites in a model may lead to an under-279 
estimate of the reproduction number following a reduction phase in the epidemic. In the 280 
case modelled, the reproduction number found in the model with fomites includes within 281 
its 95% confidence interval Rlde  > 1, so that the epidemic in the UK may have already re-282 
entered a growing phase by August. 283 
 284 
Direct verification of a fomite contribution would help validate the model, but this is 285 
made difficult by the low prevalence of infectious-inducing fomites, as shown in Fig.2 286 
and Table 4. The most direct means of ascertaining the contribution of indirect 287 
transmission may be through direct random testing for contaminated material. As 288 
illustrated for UK postal deliveries, however, at most only a few in a thousand letters and 289 
parcels delivered in a day would be contaminated. Post-lockdown easing, the numbers are 290 
even smaller, below one in ten thousand. This would require the testing of tens of 291 
thousands of independent, randomly selected delivered articles, which is likely 292 
prohibitive. Another approach would be to search for a statistically significant increase in 293 
COVID-19 among recipients of post from infectious (pre-symptomatic) postal workers 294 
later verified by testing to have been ill, but the numbers again will be small. 295 
 296 
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Studies similar to this one could be repeated for other countries to see if similar 297 
improvements in matching the data are found, particularly if similar values of Nf were 298 
found. Smaller, isolated environments may also be modelled, although small samples are 299 
increasingly prone to variations particular to each case. Cruise ships [18, 19], and 300 
possibly large work spaces [20], may be especially helpful for establishing the production 301 
rate and prevalence of fomites. Surveys of potential fomites even in non-infected 302 
environments would help to assess how frequently fomites may be introduced into a 303 
given environment that could provide data for epidemic population modelling. 304 
 305 
4.2 Limitations 306 
 307 
Further measurements of the duration of SARS-CoV-2 on substances in real world 308 
situations are required. Other factors than direct transmission and fomites may also 309 
contribute to the spread of the illness, such as aerosols, blood, urine and feces, although 310 
transmission by any of these has not been demonstrated conclusively [4]. The differences 311 
found here from a model allowing only for direct transmission may partly, or even 312 
entirely, arise from other means of transmission such as these. Alternatively, it could 313 
reflect a continuously evolving reproduction number Rt. The relative simplicity with 314 
which the fomite term improves the fit to the data, however, would seem to argue in its 315 
favour. 316 
 317 
Both direct and indirect transmission rates may differ among sub-populations of different 318 
ages. Allowing for age-dependent transmission rates and transmission between age 319 
 17 
groups would further add to the uncertainty in the contribution by fomites. Another 320 
limitation of the SEIR model is that it implicitly assumes exponential distributions for the 321 
exposed and infectious phases. The actual distributions are still unknown [21]. Other 322 
statistical distributions may prove more accurate once more data become available. 323 
 324 
A maximum likelihood approach requires a probabilistic model for the data. In this study 325 
the weekly reports of the number of registered deaths in the UK resulting from COVID-326 
19, as reported by the Office of National Statistics, were used. The numbers were 327 
modelled by the minimal assumption of Poisson fluctuations, as these depend only on the 328 
reported numbers. The determinations are based on a combination of testing and 329 
physician assessments. As such they are prone to testing limitations and possibly 330 
subjective judgement. Large day-to-day variations are found, suggestive of large 331 
correlations in time. Following ONS practice, weekly numbers were used to smooth these 332 
fluctuations and suppress their correlations. Further understanding of the nature of the 333 
fluctuations and possible remaining week-to-week correlations would likely broaden the 334 
error estimates provided here. These uncertainties are common to any population models 335 
of the epidemic. 336 
 337 
4.3 Policy Implications 338 
 339 
The possibility of transmission from fomites may be especially relevant to policies 340 
designed to protect the more than two million clinically extremely vulnerable people in 341 
the UK, as self-shielding alone may not be adequate. Modelling differences in the 342 
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infection rates between shielded and unshielded sub-populations may be a means of 343 
determining how great a risk factor indirection transmission is. If the risk of indirect 344 
transmission through postal deliveries is assessed to be a significant contributor to the 345 
spread of COVID-19, a possible means of mitigation is the effective use of face 346 
coverings, under appropriate guidance [22], by postal workers coming into direct contact 347 
with postal items within a day of delivery. A solution considered in the context of re-348 
using PPE equipment is heating used equipment or exposing it to UV radiation [23]. Such 349 
an approach could be considered for post, such as exposure to sunlight for periods of 350 
several minutes to a half hour [24], and for other articles that commonly come in contact 351 
with the public such as food packages. The tests on PPE equipment, however, were 352 
inconclusive in terms of re-required dosages in realistic scenarios [23]. It is unknown 353 
how effective exposure to sunlight would be on post in a realistic environment; post is 354 
also often concealed until delivered for security reasons, so procedural adjustments would 355 
be required. Until improved assessments are made, or other means of removing or 356 
preventing contamination become available, perhaps the simplest advice to give the 357 
public is to isolate potentially contaminated articles for 24 hours before handling or at 358 
least to wash their hands after doing so. 359 
 360 
Conclusions 361 
 362 
A maximum likelihood analysis of a SEIR model with an added fomite term applied to 363 
the COVID-19 epidemic in the UK suggests a significant fomite contribution, with 0.009 364 
± 0.001 (95% CI) infection-inducing fomites introduced into the environment per day per 365 
 19 
infectious person. The fomite term significantly shifts the inferred values of Rt compared 366 
with best-fit non-fomite solutions. It is suggested fomites be incorporated into more 367 
refined stochastic models and simulations to better assess the effectiveness of non-368 
pharmaceutical interventions in curbing the epidemic. 369 
 370 
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 515 
Parameter Description Value Reference 
R0 initial reproduction number 1.5 < R0 < 5.5         9, 3 
Rld post-lockdown reproduction number      0.3 ≤ Rld ≤ 2 3 
Rlde post-easing reproduction number 0 ≤ Rlde ≤ 2 Assumed 
Nf fomite transmission rate (per day per inf. person) 0 ≤ Nf ≤ 0.05 Assumed 
De duration of exposed period 4 days 9 
Di duration of infectious period 5 days 9 
Df duration of fomite infectious period   0.21, 0.34, 0.41 day 5 
c0 peak source rate per capita 10−6 day−1 12 
tc0 time of source peak day 77 12 
FWHM source distribution full width at half maximum 8 days 12 
 516 
         Table 1: Model parameters. 517 
 518 
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 526 
Age range 
(yrs) 
Population fraction 
(ONS projection for 2020) 
Case Fatality Rate 
(from [9]) 
0-9 0.12 0.00% 
10-19 0.11 0.09% 
20-29 0.13 0.10% 
  30-39 0.13 0.12% 
40-49 0.13 0.23%  
50-59 0.14 0.68%  
60-69 0.11 1.87% 
70-79 0.086 4.14%  
80-89 0.042 7.68% 
  527 
     Table 2:        Age-stratified case fatality rates from COVID-19 in UK 528 
 529 
 530 
 531 
 532 
 533 
 534 
 535 
 536 
 537 
 538 
 539 
 540 
 541 
 542 
 543 
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 545 
 546 
 547 
Week 
 
Registered deaths Week Registered deaths 
11 5 23 1697 
12 114 24 1204 
13 607 25 849 
  14 3801 26 651 
15 6888 27 561 
16 9495 28 388 
17 9008 29 303 
18 6680 30 231 
19 4426 31 201 
20 4214 32 162 
21 2872 33 146 
22 2000 34 149 
    
       Table 3: Weekly registered deaths in the UK5 548 
 549 
 550 
 551 
 552 
 
5 Data reported by the Office for National Statistics [1]. 
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 553 
Df Rld Rlde Nf Nff*max/Df Relative 
likelihood 
      
(day)   (fomites 
day−1 (inf. 
person)−1) 
(infections 
day−1 (susc. 
person)−1) 
 
0.21 0.786 
±0.009 
0.994 
±0.034 
0.0086 
±0.013 
(2.3±0.2)x10-4         1.00 
0.34 0.785 ±0.009 
0.991 
±0.034 
0.0089 
±0.013 (2.4±0.2)x10
-4 1.02 
0.41 0.784 ±0.009 
0.991 
±0.034 
0.0090 
±0.013 (2.4±0.2)x10
-4 1.01 
Avg 0.785 ±0.009 
0.992 
±0.034 
0.0088 
±0.014 (2.4±0.2)x10
-4  
    − 0.842 ±0.003 
0.922 
±0.032        0 − 
 
 554 
         Table 4: Model results.3 555 
 556 
3Indicated uncertainties show 95% CI. The ‘Avg’ in the fourth row is the statistical 557 
average over the cases Df = 0.21, 0.34 and 0.41 day. The last row with Nf = 0 corresponds 558 
to the case with no fomites. The second to last column shows the peak rate of infections 559 
from fomites per susceptible person per day. 560 
 561 
 562 
 563 
 564 
 565 
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 566 
Figure 1: Predicted weekly death rates for the maximum likelihood (MLH) model 567 
including fomite transmission (blue solid line, with 95% CI), excess deaths compared 568 
with a counterfactual model assuming the same reproduction numbers as for the 569 
maximum likelihood model but without fomite transmission (cyan dashed-line, with 95% 570 
CI), and the maximum likelihood model assuming no fomite transmission (magenta 571 
dotted-line, with 95% CI). The data points are the total weekly number of deaths in the 572 
UK due to COVID-19 as reported by the Office for National Statistics (Table 3). 573 
 574 
Figure 2: The average daily rate of new infections per susceptible person per day 575 
produced by fomites, Tf f/Df , (blue solid line), and by direct transmission, Rt i/Di , (cyan 576 
dashed line), both for the maximum likelihood model for a mean fomite duration time Df 577 
= 0.2 day and Cf = 0.57 day-1 capita-1. 578 
 579 
